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RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS 
Brunson i\lacChcsncy 
TIll! problems involved in the ~lJbjeel 
of reeognition in international law arc 
imporlant onC8, cv{~n though they laek 
the dramatie appeal of such topie:-: a~ 
war and pea!:e, ouler ~paee, and on'an 
~I'aee. Sim'l' :;tale:; an' lhc basic unil:; in 
lhl' inll'rnalional legal sY'otem, rl'l"o)!ni-
tion plays a vilal roll' in tlw deterlnina-
lion of 1 he qualified actors in tlw 
:;ysll'm. Similarly. whal govern IIIl'nl 
rl'pn':;('nl:; a ,.;lall' i~ a :;i/!:nifil'anl maltl'r. 
~ lorl'o\'('r. t hI' e)l.('h·i:;(' of juri:;didion hy 
all(,~l'd :;lale:; and /!:ovcrnnH'nl::: may 
dl'pcnd for its l'ffeeli\'el\(~~s on reco/!:ni-
tion. The ~uhjcct is not an ea~y one to 
explain or undersland. There is a vast 
amount of state practice that is rar from 
l'!lIIsist(~nt, a clash of doctrinal explana-
lion. and a hewildl'ring variety of tcnni-
nolo~y. 
I{('('o)!nilion involVl's thc que:;lion of 
what altitude :;;tal('~ will take with 1'1'-
ganl to a variety of factual situation:; 
and th(' legal con:::el)uenees that !low 
frolll formal rccognition of the$(~ situa-
liol1~. a::: wl·1I a::: I' Will llll' 110Ill'l'l'o/!:ni-
tiol1 of :;Ul'h $ilualion:;. i\lajor an'a:; 
!:onl"l'r11 the exisLelll'c of slate:;, govern-
ments. war, neutrality, hclligcrcney, and 
the erfect of nonrecognition of illegal 
claims to territory. The primary rocus 
of this lecture will 'be 011 the problems 
arisin/!: out of recognition and non-
recognition of statcs and governnH'nts. 
The requisites for statehood in inter-
national law have heen formulated in 
various ways, hut thcre is substantial 
agreement that tl)(~re llIust be an inde-
pendent govel'llment exereh;ing effective 
authority within a relatively well-
defined an:a. The major doctrinal eon-
troversy has hl'en whether a IWW ('ntity 
with these eharaeteri:::ties lweonw:; a 
Slate only through recognition by the 
existing states in thc world co""nunity, 
or whether the attainment of the relJui-
site factual characteristics by a new 
entity makes it a state prior to any 
recognition by existing states? In the 
books, the controversy is referred to as 
one betwcen the constitutive and de-
claratory theories of recognition. 
The traditional constitutive theory 
has heen that new entities do not 
beeollle states until they arc recognized; 
i.e., that only recognition eonsLitutc~ 
tire state, and tlrat each exiHLin~ sl"te is 
under no duty to recognize a new 1'lItity 
that Iras allailll'd the rt'ljl,i:;ite flletual 
eharactcristics. III the absence of any 
procedures for collective recognition of 
a new entity, this mcant that an entity 
might be n'eo~ni1.l'd hy ~onH! ~tatl's bul 
not by olhcrs. A furthcr thcoretical 
consequence was that the new entity, if 
unrecognized, was not a subjcct of 
international law and therefore allegedly 
had no rights or obligations under inter-
national law. 
The late Professor Lauterpacht made 
an important modifieation in consti-
tutive theory by arf!uing that existing 
state~ were undl'r a duly to n'('of!nize a 
new entity lhat mel lhl' requisilc fadual 
charaderistics. His book on rccognition 
elahorates his argument and purports to 
find ~upport for it in state praetice. IIi:; 
aq.(uml'nt, if al'c"plt'd in practicl', would 
do much lo obviate lhl' po:;:;ibililil':; of 
an cnlity lwing recogni1.ed by somc 
slales and not by others. It would 
introduce order into a vital aspect of 
in ternational relations. It would also, if 
:;imilarly acceptl'll, decrease the praeti-
cal importance of an entity thcoretically 
not subjcct to rights and dutics under 
international law . 
tinder the declaratory theory, an 
entity which allains the requisite factual 
eharaeteristies therehy commences its 
existence a:; a state under international 
law without the need of rceognition by 
exi:;ting slal!~s and is accordingly from 
that point forward a subjcct of inll'r-
national law with all thc rights and 
duties of a slale. Hecognilion, under 
this theory, serves only to declare what 
already existed and to indicate a willing-
ness on the part of the recognizing state 
lo accord the recognized state the privi-
leges of a state. This is normally ac-
companied hy the opening of diplo-
matic relations between the two states. 
Under this theory the recognizing state 
is also under no duty to recognize the 
ncw entity, but, since, under thal 
theory, the entily is almady a statc, the 
concl'ptnal and practical diffil'ulties 
pOH'd by thl' conSlitutive theory do nol 
Anolher way of stating the sallie 
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prohlem is to ask whether recognition is 
governed hy legal rulcs or is domina led 
hy politil'al eon~ille"'ltions. l,aull'r-
pacht's constitutive theory favors the 
former while the declaratory view favors 
the latter. Most modern Anglo-
American writers disagree with Lauter-
pacht. And, in my opinion, state prac-
tiee, as a principal creator of interna-
tional law, lends more support to the 
declaratory and political views. This is 
not to say that states totally ignore legal 
considerations or that in many instance:; 
statl's do not reach the same results 
regardless of theories. 
Although the foregoing discussion 
related to the recognition of states, the 
same I'ontrovl'r~y I~xist~ with respl'd to 
rl'eognition of governments of existing 
stales. The United States both in theory 
and practice adheres to the declaratory 
vil:w, as was vigorously delllonstrated by 
AlTlha~sador A IIstin in the tlnited Na-
tions in defending till' imnll:diate recog-
nition of the provisional goverrllnl:nt of 
Israel as the de facto authority of the 
new statc. ()n the other hand, the 
United Kingdom, in an official state-
ment by the Foreign Secretary in 11):> I, 
defined their recognition policy in con-
stitutive terms. Although their recogni-
tioll of the Communist Chinese Covern-
ment could be considered as consistent 
with that theory, their rclatiolls with 
sOllle other Communist regimes is im-
possihle to squarc wilh that tlll·ory. An 
example is their continllcd nonreeogni-
tioll of I~ast (;ermany. 
It is apparently paradoxieal that, 
while there is no ah'l'eement with respect 
to the legal character of recognition, 
there is a suhstan tial consenslls that 
premature recognition is a violation of 
international law. For example, a state 
that recogni1.es a ncw entity that does 
not have the requisite characteristics has 
injurcd the existing state out of which 
the new entity elaims to have fontll'd a 
~late. By way of a na 1 0:..')' , in our Civil 
War the Uniled States daimell that 
{;n'at Britain's Prodamation of Neu-
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trality, which consequentially rccog-
nized thc bdligereney of the Con-
federate SLaLes, was premaLurt!. In view 
of the prior United SLates Proelamation 
of a Blockade, our arguinent was Clearly 
unsound. Ilowever, it should he noted 
that Great Britain never recognized the 
Confederacy as a state or government 
but only as a belligerent. 
This reference to bclligerency as an 
intermediate status short of recognition 
as a sLate or government leads con-
veniently to a discussion of the usc of 
the terllls de facto and de jure in 
connection wiLh recognition. Thc terms 
arc used in differcnt contexts and arc 
not givcn a consistenL meaning. Some-
Limes, de facio is u:;ed to indicaLl' LhaL 
the recognition being cXLended is tcnLa-
tive. It is not the recognition that is de 
facto: the oLher state or government is 
heing Ln!ated as a de facto enLity. Thc 
Lerm is also used to dl!serihe policies 0 f 
recogniLion. An I:xalllple is the exLend-
ing of reGognition Lo any regime that is 
in effective control of the state regard-
less of other considerations. Although 
the question is debatable, it is believed 
useful in practice to be able to deal with 
recognition in stages and permit the 
intermediate step of recognizing a 
regime as de facto prior to a possible 
further recognition as a regime de jllre. 
The problem of recognition of states 
obviously occurs less frequently than 
the questioll of recognition of govern-
ments. Although occasionally a new 
sLate has emerged from a territory not 
previow;ly organized as a staLe, the more 
typical issue arises out of an allcml'L hy 
a rebel group to secede from a parent 
staLe, either in part of its existing 
territory, or in what was formerly, for 
example, a colonial terri Lory . In this 
context it is easy to UlulersLand why 
premature recognition was an offense. 
As previously indicaLed, the generally 
an:el'Led test of statehood is thaL of an 
illdl'IHmdl'lIt govl'rnnll'lII I'xl'rl'i:;illg I'f-
fectiv{! authoriLy within a relalively 11t:-
fined arl'a. Implil'il in thl$l! rl'quirt,-
ments, or possibly an allllitiollal cri-
terion, is that it reasonably appears that 
t hl$l! reI( uirenwnls will I:onl illlill 10 III' 
satisfied. TIll: practice of tlw lInitl!d 
States until recent times has been fairly 
consistent in the application of this test 
to new entities seeking statehood. It is 
perhaps best illustrated in tIl<: eourse of 
our recognition of the new states in 
Latin America in the early 19th cen-
tury. The United Kingdom has, until 
recent timcs, also followed essentially 
the same policy. Since World War II our 
action with rcspect to tl\(: governnwnt 
of Comlllunist China, and the alleged· 
states and governments of East Gl'r-
lIIan)" North Korea, and North Vielnam 
has hel!l\ hased on diffl!rent l'on~illl'ra­
tions. A~ Kaplan and Kutzenhuch point 
out, reeognition, or rather nonrecogni-
tion, in relation to the opposing bloc, is 
primarily a political weapon. In tIll! 
ah!ll~nee of an ovcrall 8eLtlenll'nL, tlll'se 
oLllI'r allel-(ed I-(overllnll!nts allll !llutel:' 
81~I:m rt~a~olla('ly permalll'nt, yl'l WI: will 
continue to witlrhold rccognition. Al-
though, after Worlll War I, the IJlw::otion 
of reeol!nition of tire ~ovil't (;OVCrll-
Illl!nt was not. technically, a mall{'r or 
reco~nition of a state, their IIra:;tic 
break with tlrc pal:'t lIIade it a similar 
Ijue::otion in policy terms. 
Since World War I L anll I'arlieularly 
in reGent year:;, our prat:lil'l: willr 
rC81'I'et to the ret:ognition of new l:'tatl'l:' 
in ,\fro-Asia has al::;o hCI'n (,a~I!11 on 
different criteria. lIere, the rapill ending 
of colonialism and tire plannell Im'para-
tion of new stall'S for illllt'pl!ndl!lH:I'. 
either unrler the auspicI:::O of lhe Unitl'd 
Nations or by the parcnt powers such as 
England and Francc, has led to almo::ot 
instantaneous recognition or even recog-
nition prior to official independence. As 
Kuplan and Katzenhaelr point out, COIII-
petition with the ~oviet Union was 
eertainly a faetor. Mort'ovl:r, frt'lJllently 
no rt!al eonsideration wus ~ivI'n to lhe 
I'rospr:cLs of pl'rnl<llIl'l1I:Y of II\(: nl'w 
stutl'S, nor 10 tire essl'nliul cffectivem'ss 
of their rt':rimes. 
The n'cognilion of govern lIIen Lo; 
rai~es signifiranlly different i~ues. The 
8hllt~. aln~lIIly re~l:ogni1.I'd, conlinue:s lo 
cxist as a slall: and lhl: Ilucslion is 
whl!lhl~r a parlicular nlhrlmc is the gov-
crnment of thal slalc. In the normal and 
rouline: eascs of changes of governmenl, 
no el'lIlslion or need of recognilion 
arises. Il is in cases of revolulionary 
chanw: where thrre arc at le:ast two 
eOlllpl'linl! c1aimanls thal lhc issue he-
IIOnle:; ;wlIle. While lhen' might hI' saill 
lo bl: a pre'sumplion in favor of lhl: 
I't:lablislll'd governmenl, onee lhl're: 
1\II~ues a genuine civil war, the onlcollw 
of whirh it: douhlful. lhen the allilude 
of ollll'r t:lale'~ lowards the l'lainmlll:; 
bl'l'IlI111'S imporlanl. It is for Ihis silua-
lion Ihal lhl' mh,s wilh re'spl:t'l 10 
rCl'ognilion of gOVl'rIImenls arc .11'-
signed, 
As prc:\'iOlI8Iy noll'd, during lhc civil 
slrllgl-lle lhl: righL<; and ohligalions of thc 
slatl: l'onlinllll. Tlw i:;,;lIl: is which eOIll-
pclinl-l c1aimanl represe'nls that sLale for 
L1w purpose of eonlinuily. In the case of 
IWW govcrrllnenls, the lIIinimum inlerna-
liouallaw reei uimment for rccognilion is 
lhal L1w n:ginw is in c:rfeclive conlrol of 
lhl: territory ano populalion of thc 
statl:, or, more conlroversially, conlrols 
a suhslantial part of lhe: populalion and 
le'rrilory, and il is rl'asonably dl'ar it 
will SUI'(\I'I'd in displal'ing Ihl' prl'vinm; 
govl'rnnwnl. Thl: lalli'" alte:rnalivl: oh-
vionsly misl:s ddicall: qucslions of judg-
mcnt. and the possiuililes of premalure 
n~eognitiCJn are apparent. A slale: lhat 
n'I'ogni1.I's a nllW rc'gillll' on this mini-
mUIII ha:::i::: of I'ffl'clivl'lil'ss lIIay be saio 
lo follow a de facto policy of n:eogni-
lion. Thl: Uniled Slales. however. c10es 
not accept this as the solc tcst and in 
theory rcquircs. in addition, lhat the 
rehel regiml: giVl: m3surances lhat it will 
honor thl: ohIigaliom; of the slate undcr 
inll'rnaliollal law and applicahll: inlerna-
lional agl'l:I'nllmls. Inmon: modern 
liml's, parlicnlarly in IIII' ea:;e of Ihe 
Spanish Civil War. a prill:tiee was de-
vdoped. 1'~pI:I:ial\y hy the Uniled King-
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dom, of abandoning an either/or ap-
proach and treating a revolulionary 
rc:ginH: as Ihl: l'ffl'I:live: rc:gime in parlof 
lhe territory of a slale. This is what the 
United Kingdom did wilh respel:llo the 
Franco forcI~s prior lo the conclusion of 
that civil war. 
Ln carlicr times various other addi-
tional conditions for recognition were 
advanced. During the monarchical era 
sOllie aLlcmpls lo insist on legilimaey of 
sut:cl·:.<,;ion were malic:, hut proved in-
l'ffl'c:lual. It is pallmt why this was so. It 
is the rl'volulionary change: that .... ise:; 
Ihe prohle'm, and rc:volulion is in-
variahly i\ll'~al IlIlller the law of lhe 
,;Iall' in q ueslion. But revolulion is not 
ill"gal ulllh·,· inll'rnalional law. Thl' in-
It'rnaliollal law sy:.<lt·m is nol organi1.l'd 
lo ilOlil:e Ihl! inlernal n:lalion,; of its 
memhers. III the Tilloco 1\ rbitration, 
Chief Juslice Taft, liS sole arbilralor, 
made this point explicilly. lie also hdd 
in thatl:asl: lhat, frolll the slandpoint of 
an international trihunal. lhl' lesl of 
effeclivencss determines which govern-
ment has eapacity to hind the slale. 
Another reason oeeasionally invoked 
for denying recognilion is oh:icl:lion lo 
thc inhumane methods cmployed hy tlH: 
rehcl faelion as distin~uished frolll lheir 
iIIegilimate orip;in. Inslances arc (;"reat 
Brilain's aLlitudl' loward the French 
Hevolution. and the alliluc\e of lhe 
Uniled Slales and others toward lhe 
inilial gt:i1.l1re of power by thl' Soviels. 
Bill lhis. too. does not provc lo be 
effeclive in an international syslcm 
wilhoul power 10 dl'al wilh oUlrageous 
condllc:L hy wdl-eslabli:.<hed regimes. lo 
say nOlhing of rc:vollllionary regimes. 
Only an cffective! world govcrnment will 
be able lo cxcreise sueh a power, and 
present prospects for such a develop-
ment arc nol eneourap;ing. 
!{e:ferencc has alreadv hecII made lo 
lhl' Uniled Slates additional condilion 
for rC'col!"ilion. 11l1llH'ly. Ihal Ihe: rl'gimt: 
ill qurslion illdiralr:.< il,; willinl!lll'~ lo 
fulfill ils oblil!alions uneIe-.. inlernalional 
law and applieablc: inlerualional al-,rrel'-
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IIIents. This policy was not ori!!inally 
followed .. kfferson stated in connection 
wiLh til(' Fn~r)(:h \{evolutioll that our 
policy was to rcco~lIil'.e allY ~overrlJllI'ut 
"which is fornwd by the will of the 
natioll', suhstantially declared." SOllie 
have asserted that, except for the Wil-
sonian illterlude to he melltioned later, 
this policy has heell consistcntly fol-
lowed. Lauterpaeht refers to it as. in 
ess\'nce, a rcquiremellt of the eOIlSt'IIt of 
the !!overned ill ordt'r to demollstratc 
that the re~ime will he effeetiVl" wit h 
prospeeL" of permanellcy. lie further 
asserts that hoLh the United States alld 
the Ullited Kinl!dom pur""l'd thit< policy 
with fair consisll'lIc), until the elld of 
thl' fin;t Wmld Wilr. Ohviously, the tl'~1 
is fill' fmm preei~I' alld was variously 
inll'rprl'll'd in pral'liee. In SOInl' ill-
stances it ealled for free dl'elions,. while 
in olher,; popular eOllscnt was inferred 
Oil Ihc basis of very inconclusive evi-
deneeindeed. 
Presidenl Wilson added to the prin-
ciple, especially in connection with 
Latin America, the further test of con-
stitulionality under the law of the state 
ill question. l\loreovcr, thc Unitcd 
Statcs, although not a party, supporLed 
the Central-Amcriean Treaties of J <)07 
and 1 <)2;~ in relation to the parties 
therclo. These treaties embodied' a eon-
slilulional test and additional restric-
tiolls. Suhseq uelltl)', in tlw 1I0over 
ad mi nistra tion, the eonsti tutional test 
was ahandoned, and we purported to 
revert to the .I effersl.lnian policy. 
II 1':111 he said Ihal. followinl! World 
\\ ar I. the n:lJuirenwllt or popular I'on-
sent was gradually abandoned hy hoth 
the United States and the United K ing-
dom in the face of the rise of dictatorial 
governmenls exercising effective power. 
This neccssarily brid survey of varying 
allitude" of the United Slatcs should 
not suggest that anyone test has neces-
sarily been consistently applied in any 
pl'riod. 'fhi" i" ('l'rlainly lrue at the 
prescnt lillle. WI' wOllld appear to have 
several policies. In Latin A IIwrica we 
have developed a practice or informal 
consultatioll wiLh the other members of 
IIII' ()r:.~anil'.alion or AIIlI'ril':1II Slalt'!\ 
with n'sJlI~el 10 till! reeognilion or dl! 
faciO governlllellts in L1ral an'a. Whill~ 
thc eOllsultation is collecLiv(~, thl~ indi-
vidual m(~mber slate rctains Lire powcr 
of ultimate decision. In the Resolution 
of the OAS emhodying this procedure, 
it is interestinl! to note Lhat sLress is laid 
on free clections and willingness to 
honor intl'rnational ohlil!ations as the 
principal criteria to he lak(m inLo ae-
(,Ollnt. On the other hand, in rdation to 
the COlllmunisL blo(~ or hloes, our policy 
wilh res(ll't:I to n'eol!nitioll of /!OVl'rn-
Illellis. jusl as ill thl' ('a~I' of III'W 
COII\lllullisL slall's, has hel'lI l!0V('I'I\('t1 hy 
polilil'al ('llllsitll'raLiolls in the context 
of Ihl' "('old war." 
Bdore prOl:eetlillg to nonrecognition, 
it might he useful to refer bridly to thl~ 
modes, or lIIeLhods, of reeoglli tioll. Thl: 
state or governmcnt seckillg recognition 
obviously wanls to inLerpret mosL ra-
vorably to itself any ambiguous state-
ment or action of other governments 
that might imply recognitioll. On the 
other hand, the state eomtelllplaLing 
recogllition wishes to control Lhe pro-
cess. Since it is, 1II0re typically, smaller 
or weaker states, or the governments 
thereof, that arc seeking recognition, it 
is the major nations tllat have insisted 
that recognition is a maLter of intention 
and that allY ambiguous act which 
might imply recognition may be negated 
by a disclaimer of intention to recog-
nize. 
CerL:lin formal acts clearly eonstiLute 
recognition, such as an exchange or 
reception of ambassadors, or the conclu-
sion of a bilateral treaty. Appointment 
and reception of consuls, on the other 
hand, does not resulL in recognition 
although lhe re(plest for and issll:lnee of 
an exequatur probably docs. In the case 
of mulLilateral Ireaties, it is, however, 
generally al!recd that participaLing as a 
party thereLo along with an unrecog-
nil'.ed state or government c10es not 
constitutc recognition. The same view 
prevails with respect to participating in 
internaLional conferenccs wiLh unrecog-
nized rcgimes. Although thcre was some 
original difference of opinion with 
respect to memhership in the League of 
Nations, expecially when the allegedly 
recognizing state voted for admission, it 
came to be accepted, and is accepted in 
the United Nations, that admission to 
mcmhership docs not imply reeognition 
on the part of other members that the 
entity in question is heing recognized, 
apart from memhership, as a state or 
government. The practical reasons for 
these last few conclu~ions are ohvious. 
Any oLher view would p:lralyzc Llw 
proc:c:.sscs and in:::LiLuLions involved. 
The c:lution of rccognizing sLuLes, 
howevcr, even in these :lreas, is iIIus-
Lmted hy :I recent example. The Nuclear 
Tc:::t-Ban Treaty provid(:(1 th:lt LIII: 
UniL(!d SLates, till! Unitcd Kingdom, and 
Lhe Sovict Union should c:lch III: a 
(1('spo~iLary and it was clearly under-
stood that East Germany's deposit of its 
declaration of acccssion to the Trcaty 
with the Soviet Union would have no 
effect on its continucd nonrecognition 
hy the other depositaries. The United 
States conLention that East Germany 
would nonctheless he hound by their 
accession to the Treaty is more contro-
ver:::iaI. 
I f we accept intention as the decisive 
test, many in formal reiaLions with un-
recognized regimes arc possible, such as 
negotiations, tempor:lry miliLary agree-
nllmLs, :lnd contilllmncc of trmli:. Our 
v:lriolls d(,alings with the Chinese Com-
munist Government arc a recent demon-
straLion of this practice, and there are 
many other similar cases. This possi-
hility of maintaining informal relations 
wiLh unrecognized regimcs makes more 
palatahle and practical the policy of 
nonrecognition of slates and govern-
mcnts which mect the criLeria for those 
sLaLuses, I>e:;pitc a theoreLicalll'gal void, 
tl,,:re is an expedient accommodation to 
the Jlrohli~m. 
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Turning "to the phcnomcnon of non-
n'('ol-(niLion of statcs and governnwnt~, 
what ,If(' till: Icgal eonS(:'1II1'nC(!:; in 
international and uOlllcstic law'! lVlany 
of the important conscquences arc in 
domestic law, so that hcre we shall be 
considering "foreign relations law" as 
well as international law, strictly speak-
ing. Accepting the declaratory theory as 
in accordance with the practice of 
states, we have states and governments 
which meet the criteria for recognition 
but arc not recognizeu. What arc the 
respective rights and duties between the 
cxisting entities and such unrecognized 
cnliLil':;? 
BI'f,'rrinp; Lo our previous disl'II::::;ion 
of informal n'lalions, we :;l'C thaI :;oml' 
rdaLious lIIay :lnd do t:lke pl:lee be-
t wecn thelll. Speaking p;enerally, thc 
unrecognized entity, be it slate or gov-
ernnwnt, whieh has lIIeL LI\(! requisiLe 
criteri:l, has the rights of a staLe in 
international I:lw, although it e:ln be 
prevente(l from exercising them if the 
rights can only he exerei:;etl hy a slate, 
and the nonrecognizing sLate refuses to 
treat the purported ex(~rcise as the 
action of the government of Lhe oLlwr 
:lHeged state. Tlw 8:1nH! raLionale eon-
trois with rt!8pect Lo Lhe obligatons of 
such an entity. The qlH:stions mainly 
arise with respect to unreeogniz('tl I!0V-
ern meuts rathl'r than slatl's. I t is clt'ar 
that tlw nonrecognition of a pilrtieular 
governnll!nt tloe~ not tlepriv,! till: sLaLe 
of its righLs or relieve it of its tllltil!s 
under interniltiO/wllaw undl!r Lhe condi-
tions ~lillt'd. This i::: a l'on!<clp\(!nCI' of 
the continuity of states. 
Thc previous statemcnts dealt with 
established rights and oblig:ltions. But 
an unrt!cogni~ed regime meeting the 
Iwress:lry criteria can also creall~ new 
right:; mul ohligations with res(let:L to iI 
sLate th:lt has not reeol!nized it. In the 
Tinoco Arbitration previously men-
tioned, the effective government in 
Co:>la Hieil (lhl' Tinol'o Con-mlllent) 
was hdd Lo hilvl! hound LhaL slaLe in 
n'laLion Lo (:r('at Brilain whieh h:l::: not 
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reeognized LhaL governmenL. I\.s Chief 
.J usLice TafL poinLed oliL in his opinion, 
Lhe usc of nonmeognition as a polilieal 
weapon drm;tieally reduces its vailic as 
evidence of the nonexistence of an 
effective regime. 
l'arenLlu:tically, it should he men-
tioned thaL a recogni)l;ed regime, even 
though no longer in control of sOllie or 
all of its former Lerritory, continues 
with its rights and ohligations and may 
create new rights and obligations with 
nationals of another state still [('cog-
nizing it, with respect to areas outside 
of the rehel regime's eonLrol. Thus, the 
puhlie assets of a state with sueh a 
recognized rqdlllt:, til(! a~sd~ Iwing 10-
eated within a staLe ["('cognizing it. will 
he awarded by the courts of that recog-
nizing ~tate to the recogni)l;ed govern-
ment. This was the LreatmenL accorded 
hy tlu: eourts of II,,· recognizing states 
to the a:;:;<:Is, wiLhin thosc recognizing 
states, 0 f the I!0vernmcnls-in-exilc dur-
ing World War ll. Furthermore, if a state 
has one regime which is being recog-
nized as de jure ancI another as de facto 
at the same time by a reeogni)l;ing state, 
the courts of that state will award the 
public funds to the de jILre regime. Two 
BriLish dl'ei~ions concerned wiLh Lhe 
recognition of Ethiopian claims in Eng-
land turned on this distineLion, which 
demom;tratl's thaI. for domestic law OIL 
least, wlll'tlu'r reeogniLion is de fac·to or 
elC! jUre! lIIakes a ~igniri(:ant difl'eren(:(!. 
The firsL decision held thaL the Em-
peror, as the ruler ele jUre!, was entitled 
to eollc'("L a deht which had at:cmed 
before the recognition of the King of 
Italy as the ruler de facto. When Eng-
land subsequently recognized the King 
of Italy as the ruler de jllre, in the same 
easc on appeal, it was held that the: King 
was Lhen entitled to c:ollecL the dehL. 
We have heen discussing the rulcs 
rdating to unrecognized regimcs meet-
ing tlw relevant criteria. WhaL of the 
rights and obligations of unrt'('ogni1.('d 
revolutionary r('gilll(,s LhaL do noL nled 
till' tesls for an d'fec:live governlllenL 
either OIL the Lime of acting or suhse-
quenLly? Such regimes do not have any 
g(!IH'ral ("lIpac:ity lo erellt(: rights and 
ohligations in relation to another :;tall~, 
huL inLernaLional law docs recogni1.e a 
limiLed capacity Lo validatc acls per-
formed in a territory within its control 
and relating to routine governmental 
administration raLher than in support of 
its own ljuest for conLrol of the sLate it 
purports to represcnt. I\.n inLernational 
arhiLral decision to this effeeL held Lhat 
the sale hy such a regime of a po~tal 
money order was binding on the state 
and its successor recognized govern-
menL. 
Finally, whal is till! l'ff(:d of SUh8('-
'Im'nt f('('ognition of a ~tat(: or gov\'rn-
ment thaL hau previously met the requi-
site criLcria·? l{ecognition releases lhe 
restrictions that hau prcviously existcd 
as to righLs and ohligations thaL Iwd 
required aeknowledgmcnt tlll'reof hy 
the reeogni)l;ing state. The furlher qucs-
tion of whether recognition is retro-
active with respect to acts perforJIH'd 
before recognition but after meeting lhe 
requisiLe criteria is not governed hy 
international la'r. This follows from 
acceptance of the theory that there is 
no duty to recognize even when lhe 
requisite critcria exist. Ilowever, retro-
activiLy is si{!niricanL in the internal law 
of the recognizing staLe, and the scope 
of the principle will be developed in the 
suhsequent discussion of tlw donwsti(: 
legal consequences of recognition a 1111 
nonreeogniLion. 
WiLhdrawal of n:cognition is anollll'r 
maller which should be brieflv can-
vassed. In Lheory, if a sLaLe or a govern-
ment fails lo maintain the requisite 
criteria, then wiLhdrawal of recognilion 
is appropriate. In praeLice, withdrawal 
normaUv occurs when a new state re-
places the previously rccognized state, 
or a new governmenL is recognized in 
place of the preeeding one. The pn~-
8uJIlption as to the existing authority 
applies here. Until 11 new state or gov-
ernmenL meets the requisiLe eriLeria, 
wiLhdrawal of previous recognition 
would he inappropriale. SOnH! authori-
ti(!s add, however, thal withdrawal is 
appropriate if the inilial n-eognition was 
tentative--i.e., de facto--and the requisite 
criteria have not materialized. The !te-
statcment of Foreign 1{e1ations Law 
states that no instance of withdrawal of 
recognition has heen found except in 
thc si tuaLions ahove mentioned. 
In theory, wiLhdrawal should not hc 
baSI-II on disapproval of a recognized 
regime_ buL ollly on f'lilurt- to maintuin 
the req uisil<- criLeria. I n fact, sLaLes 
disapproving of u previously recogniz(-(I 
regillH! do not withdmw rccognition hut 
s!wer diplonUltic relaLions. For cxample, 
Gn-at BriL<lill recognized the Soviet 
Union de facto mlll subt<e!luently eI(· jure 
and <l few years later scvered diplomaLi!: 
relations. lIere, therc is a legal curiosity. 
Severance of diplorllatic relations docs 
not present many of the problems 
thought to arise out of nonreeognition. 
In the Sabbatillo case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sq uarcly held that the Castro 
Cuban Government, as a government 
that the United States had recognized, 
could sue in the courts of the United 
States, despite the severance of diplo-
matic relations prior to the litigation, 
even though the established rule is that 
an unrecognized government can not so 
sue. 
As previously mentioned, some of 
tire most significant legal consequences 
arising out of nonrecognition are gov-
erned by domcstic or national law as 
distinguished from international law. Tn 
earlier ref!!rence to L II!!' recognizing 
state, it was assumed that, for interna-
tional purposes, it was the executive 
braneh of the govcrnment of that state 
that made the deeision. [n the domestic 
sense, the recognizing organ is a political 
braneh of the government. The judicial 
branch is not involved. This does not 
mean that the executive's action is not 
subject lo legal restrainls. On the olher 
Irand. the judiciary Iras a significanl role 
Lo play on the donH:stic scene. as 
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distinguished from the international 
arena. The main problem for the domes-
tie judieiary is whaL staLm; should 1)(' 
gl"Hllted to <llld whaL erf!:ct should h!~ 
given to actions of an entity not recog-
nized by their executive. The complex 
and extensive domestic law on this 
subject can only he summarized, and 
the discussion will be confined to the 
domestic law of the United States and 
the United Kingdom. In what follows it 
is assumed that the unrecognized entity 
Iras. in fnel. mel the re!prisitc interna-
tionaleriteria. 
In the United Kingdom, as wcll as in 
the Uniled Slates, an unrecognizcd 
governmcnt does not have access Lo tIll! 
eour~s as :l plaintiff. On the furth!-.· 
!(Ilestion of wheLher an unrecognized 
govcrnment is entitled to immunity as a 
defendant, some decisions in the United 
States have granted immunity, contrary 
t() the British view. Our hoMings can be 
cxplained on the ground that the state, 
as such, is entitled to claim immunity. i\ 
different result would he reached if 
there were also a recognized government 
in existence, which could waive the 
immunity on behalf of the state. 
\Iost of the interesting questions 
involve the issue of what effect the 
courts should give to legislation and 
other action of an unrecognized govern-
ment. The British decisions have drawn 
quite rigidly the logical deduction that 
no effect should be given in their courts 
to action of a regime unrecognized by 
tire British Government. Thus, if the 
claimants in the Tilloco case had 
brought suit in a Brili~h eourt ralher 
than in an international tribunal, the 
acts of the effective government in 
Cosla Rica would not have bcen "recog-
nized." Even Lauterpacht, who defends 
the British position, concedes that it is 
workable only so long as the executive 
hranch accords rccognition under his 
theory that there is a legal duty to 
rccognize cntitit-s meelinp; the rcquisile 
critl!ria. The 14 years of Ilonrecognilioll 
of the Soviet Government hy the Unitl!d 
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~tates tested this theory to the hreaking 
point. and eourt::: in the lInited States 
took a mort' flt!xihlt! al'l'roadl. 
In a :::eries of decisions in the Nt'W 
York Court of Appeals, nnder the prin-
cipal al'gis of .I udge Cardozo, I hl' view 
was developed Lhat effeet would noL be 
given to the arts of the nnreeognized 
So\'i.!t regime unkss 1I0t Lo do :::0 would 
violate equity and ju:::tice. This has heen 
callcd Lhc "negative public policy" rule 
alld is far from an cxact juridical con-
cept. In:::piration for it came from 1I.S. 
Suprcme Court decisions with respect to 
the legal conscq uences of various acts 
that were performcd within Lhl' Con-
fl'dentey during LIIl' Civil \\'ar. 
:\ n'eenL New York dl'eision in tIll' 
,lIerClln' HIl.~illt'ss .l/llchill(,s case is a 
good iilustraLion of an c\'cn mon~ flexi-
hIe approach. An East (;erman corpora-
tion. wholly' mvned and eonLrollcd hy 
Lhe unrecognized East German Govern-
ment. sold type\\Titl'rs to a New York 
corporation. an importer, which failed 
to honor the trade acceptance that it 
had given in payment upon receipt of 
the typewriters. An American ciLizen 
and resident of New York, who was an 
a:;:signec for value of the East German 
corporation, sued the importer. The 
court held that he could recover on this 
private transaction even though the East 
German Government was not recog-
nized hy the United States. The saIl' and 
import of the typewriters was not for-
bidden by United States law. Under Lhe 
circumstances, the court saw no policy 
ohjection Lo enforcement of the obliga-
tion. :\ difft'renL iSSIH! would arist' out 
of a transaction originating in Commu-
nist China; trade with which is legally 
prohibited. A recent decision of the 
/louse of Lords in the Zeiss case, involv-
ing the effect of action taken by an East 
German entity in East Germany, is also 
of inLcrest. That c:ourt held that thc 
Soviet Union was the government recog-
nized de jure in tlUlt territory hy the 
British government, and Lhat the action 
Laken hy the l':ast (;erman regime was in 
accordance with authority properly 
dt'legat!!d by the Soviet Union, there!.y 
avoidillg tht! al'l'li(!ation of tIlt! l!'adi-
tiollally rigid British view whidl wOllld 
have given no effeet Lo the action of an 
ullrecognizt!d regime. 
TI\(! BestatemenL of Foreign Itda-
tions Law in Set'lion 11 ~l defines the 
scope of the United StaLl'S exception to 
nonreeogniLion of the aeLions of an 
unrecogrrizetl regime as IlCing con finet! 
Lo malll'rs of an essenLially private 
nature within the effective control of 
the unreeogni)\t!d enLity, or transfer of 
property loeali)\ed at the time of trans· 
fer in the t('rritory of tIlt! 'mn'cog\liz(~tl 
,'ntily ill It I belonging Ihell 10 a lIalional 
Ih,'n'of. Thi~ is a 1I.S. ('onflit,ts ml" mltl 
nllt a mIl' of illll'\"naliollal law. III Ihei,' 
"OJIIIIH~ntary, they point out, liS tloe:,; 
Lhe text of Sectioll 4~, Lhat the so-called 
"act of state" doctrine docs 1I0t apply 
in the case of all unreeognizcd regime. 
Briefly stated, the act of sLate doeLrine, 
another U.S. con1liets rule, provides 
that a U.S. court will not examine the 
validity of an act of a foreigll sLate 
within its terri Lory by which that staLe 
has exercised its jurisdiction Lo give 
effect to its public interests. In cases of 
foreign expropriation in violation of 
international law, this doctrine has been 
modified by congressional action in the 
context of the Castro expropriations of 
American property. By definition and 
practice, the act of state doctrine also 
does not usually apply Lo the extraterri-
torial effect of such acts, even if the 
regime is recognized. Thus, a foreign 
decree purporting to expropriate prop-
erty within the United States would be 
treated as a nullity in our courts. 
The previous discussion related to 
the effects given in U.S. courts to acts 
of an unrecognized entity meeting the 
necessary criteria. If recognition is sub-
sequently granted, courts in the United 
States will then Lreat the aets of such a 
regime prior to recogniLon as if they hat! 
been the acLs of a recognizerl enLity. 
Consequently. the act of state docLrine 
will then apply. This retroactivc effect 
servcs to validatc previously unrecog-
nized acts, mainly within the entity in 
question, as well as to validate the 
newly recognized regime's title to puhlie 
funds in the recognizing state, as pre-
viously discussed. This doctrine of retro-
activity does nol extend, however, to 
the invalidation of prior transactions 
entered into hy the then recognized 
government or ohligations of private 
parties created by that government. The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in the Guaranty 
Trust Bank case, enforced this limita-
tion on retroactivity hy holding that the 
Soviet Government, suing after it had 
been recognized, was barred by the 
running of the New York statute 0 f 
limitations prior to its recognition, since 
the then recognized Kerensky govern-
ment could have sued the bank and 
failed to do so. The Guaranty Trust 
Bank was entitled to rely on the action 
or nonaetion of the regime thcn recog-
nized by the U.S. Govcrnment. 
Only brief mention can be made of 
another important use of nonrecog-
nition outside the area of states and 
governments as such. This is the doc-
tTine of nonrecognition of illegal action, 
such as an illegal conquest of territory. 
When states act legally, there is nor-
mally no need to notify other states of 
the action taken or to receive their 
recognition of the legality of the action. 
However, when a state acts illegally, 
other states singly or collectively, can 
but need not declare that they will not 
recognize the illegal claim. Sccretary of 
State Stim~)Il invoked this doctrine 
with rcspeet to Japanese action in IVIan-
ehukuo, and the Leaguc of Nations 
passed a Resolution taking the same 
position. Of course, in the imperfectly 
organized world, fre1lucntly nothing ef-
fective is or can bc done to reversc the 
iIll:gal action. Nonrecognition is thus a 
weak sanction, serving to registl:r lIIoral 
and Icg:ll disapproval, and, Icgally, it 
scrves to prevent the illegal aelor from 
converting his illegal claim into a legal 
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one through the passage of time without 
protest. This is a general principle equal-
ly applicahle t(i lIny iIl(:g:t1 dnim al-
though it is most promincntly mcn-
tioned in connection with illcgal con-
quest of territory. For example, the 
United Statcs and other statcs protested 
thc 200-mile territorial water claims of 
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. 
Up to this point we have discussed 
recognition in terms 0 f the recognizing' 
state as a decisionmaker in fhe decen-
tmlized international community. This 
was an accurate picture IIntilthe present 
era. We now reach the question whether 
the most universal international organi-
zation, the United Nations, should fol-
low the samc standards with respect to 
recognition as individual statcs have 
previously followed. In the past some 
writers have argued that collective 
reeognitioll by all international hody 
would overcome the disadvantages of 
the natiollal political element in the 
trallitional process. 
Whatever its theoretical advantages, 
it is clear that in practice recognition [or 
purposes of membership and represcnta-
tion is divorced from whether a particu-
lar member state recognizes another 
member or its government outside the 
United Nations. The stTUggle over ad-
mitting the Communist Chinese Govern-
ment to official participation in the 
United Nations produced a memoran-
dum in 1950 by the Secretary General 
in which he stated that they were 
separate questions. He pointed out that 
traditional recognition practice was uni-
lateral and discretionary, and thaL states 
have refused to accept a collective 
reeognition procedure as a suhstitute for 
their own discretion. In the United 
Nations, however, dccisions on memher-
ship and representation arc collective. 
lie therefore argued that, for United 
Nations purposes, the test should he 
which govcrnment was the one in the 
position to carry out the obligations of 
membership most effeetivcly, rather 
than which government was recognized 
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by the members outside the United 
Nations. In his opinion, acceptance of 
his argument would have I(~d to till! 
seating of the Communist Chine8e Gov-
ernment. However, his view was rejected 
by a majority of the members and that 
government has not yet been successful 
in achieving representation in the 
United Nations. The Nationalist Chinese 
Government eontinues to represent the 
state of China, an original member. 
What is the position of the divided 
states so far as membership in the 
United Nations is concerned? In Janu-
ary of 1957 the Soviet Union proposed 
that hoth Vietnams and both Koreas 
should be admitted, arguing that they 
were all states. The General Assembly 
rejected the proposal. The sub8cquent 
motion to cleet South Vietnam and 
South Korea as members was vetoed by 
the Soviet Union in the Security Coun-
cil. In 19()6 East C ermany applied for 
membership in the United Nations and, 
in its application suggested West Ger-
many should be simultaneously clected. 
West Germany opposed the proposal, 
arguing that East Germany was not a 
state and that "it" violated human 
rights. No action was taken. The divided 
"states," therefore, continue to be ex-
cluded from membership in the United 
Nations. 
What is the status of these four areas 
outside the United Nations? Here, of 
course, the basic division with respect to 
reeognition is along bloc lines, as Kaplan 
and Katzenbach emphasize. A recent 
inquiry to the State Department on this 
question produced a reply in terllls of 
diplomatic or lesser relations with a 
regime rather than in terms of reeog-
nition. As of June 1968, 64 nations 
were said to I.ave diplomatic relations 
with Nationalist China as compared 
with 45 nations having diplomatic rela-
tions with Communist China, and 19 
nations which did not have diplomatic 
relations with either government. The 
reply estimated that in January 196B 
about 77 nations have diplomatic rela-
tions with South Korea and that 25 
nations have diplomatic relations with 
North Korea. With respect to Vil!tnllm, 
the response spoke in terms of represen-
tation in Saigon or in Hanoi, which is 
not very helpful for our recognition 
question. On this hasis, as of January 
19()7 ahout :m nations arc represenLed 
in Saigon and, as of an un8peeified datl~, 
about 22 nations in Ilanoi. This infor-
mation on representation should he 
compared wiLh a statement hy Professor 
Moore of Virginia in a reeent article in 
which he wrote that 60 nations have 
recognized South Vietnam and that 24 
nations have recognized North Vietnam. 
Although he cites no specific source for 
these statistics, they appear to be more 
relevant and accurate for the purposes 
of our inquiry. Finally, the State De-
partment reply states that West Ger-
many has diplomatic relations with at 
least 70 countries and consular relations 
with 16 more, with 13 of which there 
may be also diplomatic relations. East 
Germany is reported as having full 
diplomatic relations with 16 countries 
and lesser relations with 18 other coun-
trie8. No date is given for these C;crlllan 
8tatistics. 
This report on till! staLus of the rival 
Chincse GovcrJlnwnLs and of the dividl:d 
"staLes" hoth within mill. outside LIII: 
United Nations eoneiuiles this neel:s-
sarily broad surVl:y of lhe /t'gal al'p!!!;LS 
of recogniLion of states and govern-
ments in international law and, to sOllie 
extent, in the internal law of stales, 
especially in the "foreign relaLions" Inw 
of the United Stales. The scope of the 
lecture did not permit examination of 
every facet of the suhjcct, nor exhaus-
tive treatment of any particular segment 
that was included. II is hoped that this 
introductory analysis of many of the 
sil!:nifieaut problems in this complex 
aren will stilllulall: tlw studl'uL Lo fOrJIlII-
late his own conclusions and wiII pro-
vide an adequate foundation for his 
furlher exploration of this challenging 
topic. 
